Introduction
Between the clear predictions microeconomic theory makes for perfectly competitive and monopoly pricing lies the gray area of oligopoly pricing. Given the variety of objectives oligopolists may pursue, instruments they may use, and contexts in which they meet, F. M. Scherer noted, "Casual observation suggests that anything can happen" (Scherer, 1980, p. 151) . This is particularly true of theories of tacit collusion. The large number of possible equilibria-what Jean Tirole called "an embarrassment of riches"-is the particular bane of empirical attempts to identify tacit collusion (Tirole, 1988, p. 247) . The absence of a clear theoretical prediction of how oligopolists will coordinate makes it dif cult to distinguish ex ante a behavior used to facilitate tacit collusion from the same behavior employed innocuously.
1 Empirical economists are often left with the back-door approach of inferring tacit collusion from the observation of higher prices, leaving unspecied the mechanism used to accomplish the coordination. The aim of this paper is to identify tacit collusion in the cellular telephone industry through a front-door approach by considering an observed pricing pattern as a mechanism to achieve tacit collusion.
Economists and antitrust authorities have identi ed consciously parallel pricing practices as one means of coordinating noncompetitive behavior without explicit agreement. The speci c form that such coordination takes often appears to be an outgrowth of the prevailing business practices of an industry. An example is price leadership, in which rms closely match the price changes of a designated leader, as has been alleged in the airline industry, where computer reservation systems make observation and response to price changes easy. Another example is the adoption of common pricing formulas, such as those used by GE and Westinghouse in the 1960s to generate identical bids for turbogenerators. A well-known type of price formula is basing-point pricing, whereby geographically dispersed rms offer identical delivered prices to each customer by calculating transportation costs from the same basing point. (See Scherer 1980 .) This paper will refer to pricing schemes in which different rms set the same price within a market as price matching.
This paper hypothesizes that rms in the cellular telephone industry in the mid-1980s used a different sort of parallel pricing practice as a signal or a focal point to enable them to coordinate their actions. During this period, cellular telephone carriers are observed to set the same prices in multiple markets that they serve, particularly where they compete with the same competitor across multiple markets. In the context of this paper, this pricing pattern (the same rm setting the same price in different markets) will be referred to as identical pricing across markets or identical pricing. This should not be confused with the more familiar practice of price matching described above. While the extension of identical prices into multiple markets is not a previously documented means of coordination, it grows out of the structure and business practice of the industry.
As has been argued by rms accused in antitrust cases of consciously parallel practices, behaviors that seem to enable tacit collusion can also have benign, noncoordinated motivations. Therefore, the analysis in this paper of identical pricing across markets as a coordination mechanism begins with the consideration of noncooperative explanations. Parsimonious noncooperative models are found to be insuf cient to explain this phenomenon. Moreover, using identical prices across markets is associated with higher prices, which is presumably the goal of tacit collusion. This evidence of tacit collusion is reinforced by the inability of several alternative hypotheses to explain the incidence of higher prices. Since tacit collusion leaves no "smoking gun"-or, more aptly, "smoke-lled room"-to prove that the motivation for the behavior is collusive, this result should be taken as suggestive; it provides empirical evidence of a mechanism by which rms can use contact across multiple markets to tacitly coordinate their activities.
This paper is related to the literature on multimarket contact, much of which evaluates the effect of multimarket contact by examining the price level or pro tability in a market as a function of thetransmitter. This makes it possible for a frequency in use in one cell to be reused to carry a different call in a nonadjacent cell, thus multiplying the number of individual communications that can be carried by a limited amount of spectrum. The second prong of the solution is the mobile telephone switching of ce (MTSO), which maintains a continuous transmission when a caller moves into a cell that uses different frequencies by handing off calls to an available frequency in the adjacent cell.
Once cellular technology was viable, the FCC moved to make it commercially available by allocating 40 MHz of spectrum to cellular usage and, in 1982, beginning the process of licensing carriers to provide service. In doing so, the FCC designed an industry structure that was explicitly intended to foster competition (Kellogg et al., 1992, pp. 650-651) . This was possible because, unlike the provision of local wireline service, cellular service provision is not a natural monopoly. Most of the costs of operating a cellular network are represented in the construction of transmitters within the cells and switching of ces to transfer traf c among them. While these costs are xed costs in the sense of being sunk and invariant to a small increment of additional usage, the number of cells (and associated towers and MTSOs) is ultimately proportional to the number of subscribers a carrier serves, because a cell and its associated bandwidth can handle only a certain number of calls. As a result, serving a given number of customers in a particular area could be accomplished at approximately the same total cost either by one carrier serving all the customers with some number of cells or two carriers each serving half the customers with cells that are half as numerous and twice as big as the single carrier's cells.
The FCC's design for fostering competition was to grant two licenses in each cellular market, which were de ned according to standard metropolitan areas (SMAs). Within each market, one license was reserved for a local wireline carrier and the other was granted to a carrier not currently serving the local telephone market. Most of the wireline licenses went to the newly created Bell operating companies (BOCs). For example, Nynex holds several licences in Massachusetts, Pactel holds licenses in southern California, and Ameritech holds licenses in southwestern Ohio. (See Fig. 1 for a map of wireline license allocation.) The nonwireline licenses generally were granted either to a wireline service provider from another area of the country, or to a company specializing in providing cellular service.
2 For example, 2. The market structure established by the FCC allowed additional rms to enter by buying wholesale blocks of time from the license holders and then reselling it to consumers. In 1984-1988, the period covered by this study, resellers played only a minor role in the industry.
Pactel holds licenses in Michigan, Cellular Communications holds licenses in Ohio, and MetroMobile holds licenses in southern New England. (See Fig. 2 for a map of nonwireline license allocation.) In order to be awarded licenses, carriers were required to submit detailed applications, and the licenses were granted based on the FCC's review of the applications.
Since the FCC anticipated that competition between the two carriers in each market would prevent the exercise of market power, explicit price regulation was not considered necessary. In the early phase of the industry, most states did not impose any regulation; in some cases there was a requirement to le tariffs as a matter of information, but not as the basis for regulatory review (Anon., 1992, pp. 28-29) .
This study is based on data from the 90 largest cellular markets, which correspond to the rst three sets of licenses awarded by the FCC, during the period from December 1984 to July 1988. Not all the markets were operational at the beginning of the sample period, but service was offered in almost all by the end of the sample period. The data contain information on the markets, the carriers, and detailed price data submitted by the carriers. A complete data appendix is included at the end of the paper.
Market Contact in the Cellular Telephone Industry
There are three reasons that the cellular telephone industry is an interesting arena in which to examine issues of multimarket contact and tacit collusion. First, the FCC's design of the industry as distinct markets served by duopolists leads to a simple and intuitive way to identify multimarket contact. Second, the multidimensional pricing structure allows rms a broad scope for coordination via price signaling. Third, since the FCC's design of the market structure was predicated on the assumption that two carriers in each market would be enough to produce competitive pricing, it is of interest to examine whether that assumption was borne out in the subsequent operation of the market. The remainder of this section discusses identi cation of multimarket contact.
De ning "market contact" usually involves problems of market de nition, and also requires a judgment about what quali es as meaningful contact. In the cellular telephone industry, the FCC's license allocation process created an industry structure that avoids most of these complications. Licensing carriers to serve particular SMAs means that markets are clearly de ned, especially in the early period of the industry which is considered here, when markets were geographically noncontiguous because licenses had been granted only for large metropolitan areas. In addition, it is clear who a rm's competitor is in each market, since it faces exactly one, roughly equivalent competitor in each market that it serves.
3 A collection of single-product, geographically distinct duopolies is the simplest structure for which to de ne multimarket contact, and suggests the following straightforward de nition: two rms are considered to have contact in a market if they both hold licenses to serve that market, and to have multimarket contact if there is more than one market in which they have contact. (See Fig. 3 for markets in which carriers have multimarket contact.)
There are two minor dif culties in identifying multimarket contact in the cellular telephone industry, which have to do with how a rm is identi ed. The rst is that in some markets licenses were awarded to joint ventures comprising several telecommunications companies. In all cases, the largest shareholder in the venture has at least a 50% share, and for the purposes of this paper, a carrier is identi ed as the largest shareholder in the venture that holds the license.
The second issue is that in some cases service is marketed under a brand name that is different from that of the underlying provider. This appears to happen in two situations. The rst is when a joint venture chooses to use a different name from that of any of its members. For example, L.A. Cellular is the nonwireline license in Los Angeles, owned 60% by Bell South, 35% by Lin Broadcasting, and 5% by McCaw Cellular. The second situation is when a carrier, primarily a nonwireline license held by a nonlocal BOC, chooses to adopt a nationally recognized brand, such as Cellular One, rather than using its own name. For the purposes of this study, a carrier is identi ed as the underlying operator, not as the name under which service is marketed.
Multimarket Contact
The best-known theoretical characterization of multimarket contact is that of Bernheim and Whinston (1990) . The intuition for their primary nding is that when rms compete in multiple markets, their ability to punish deviation from tacit collusion is enhanced. As a result FIGURE 3. MULTIMARKET CONTACT of this increased ability to punish deviation, tacit collusion may be sustainable in markets where it would not be if rms did not have multimarket contact.
In keeping with this reasoning, the empirical literature has focused on examining how price levels or pro tability are affected by the extent of rms' multimarket contact, usually measured as the number of markets in which rms compete. Examples include Evans and Kessides's (1994) and Singal's (1993) examinations of the airline industry, and Rhoades and Heggestad's (1985) study of the banking industry. This approach has also been taken by Hughes and Oughton (1993) and Scott (1982) in the context of conglomerate rms that compete in multiple product markets. An alternative approach to examining how price levels or pro tability are affected by multimarket contact is to relate collusion or rivalry directly to multimarket contact. Examples include Parker and Röller's (1997) study of the cellular telephone industry, and Heggestad and Rhoades's (1978) study of the banking industry. Most of these studies have found that multimarket contact increases prices and pro tability, and decreases competition.
The emphasis of Bernheim and Whinston's model and of the empirical work related to it is that sustainable prices and pro ts are higher when rms have multimarket contact. These papers do not consider how rms might communicate or coordinate in order to achieve such an equilibrium. The emphasis of the theoretical model is on the existence of such an equilibrium, and the emphasis of the empirical work is on the achievement of prices or pro ts suggestive of such an equilibrium. Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that oligopolists who wish to move to a tacitly collusive equilibrium do so by nding a way to communicate their intentions and coordinate their actions. Examples include price leadership, basing-point or other pricing formulas, and pronouncements of trade organizations. Some of these practices have also received more formal treatment in the industrial organization literature, including Rotemberg and Saloner (1990) and Gilligan (1992) . This paper differs from previous work by suggesting that multimarket contact facilitates tacit collusion not only by enhancing the ability to punish, but by increasing rms' scope for price signaling and coordination. Since tacit collusion cannot, by de nition, rest on explicit agreement, it must rely on indirect patterns in pricing or other instruments that will be recognized or understood by competitors to signal a willingness to deviate from competition as usual. When rms have contact in multiple markets, it increases the scope of signals they can send to each other, and thus increases their ability to use consciously parallel patterns that can help coordinate tacit collusion. The emphasis of this paper is to nd not only supracompetitive prices or
FIGURE 4. HYPOTHETICAL CELLULAR PRICING EXAMPLE
pro ts, but a mechanism rms use to achieve them. In particular, this paper hypothesizes that multimarket contact in the cellular telephone industry makes possible such signaling or coordination. As described below, rms can be seen to set distinctive prices in markets in which they have multimarket contact, and when they do so, prices are higher in ways that are not attributable to other market characteristics.
Cellular Telephone Pricing
Generally, cellular telephone carriers do not offer simple linear prices. The typical cellular provider offers its customers a choice among three or four different plans, each of which usually includes a xed monthly fee, a price per minute of usage, and sometimes free minutes. Assuming that a customer chooses the plan that minimizes costs for his or her expected level of usage, the effective price schedule a customer faces is the lower envelope of a menu of two-part tariffs offered by the carrier. An example is given in Figure 4 .
Each cellular carrier sets its own, unregulated schedule of prices, which it is free to change over time. Carriers usually offer different prices in different markets. For example, at a given point in time a typical carrier serves ve markets and offers four unique price schedules. Figure 5 illustrates a hypothetical example. Consider two markets, market 1 and market 2, that are both served by the same two carriers, A and B. Each carrier offers a menu of two-part tariffs in each of the markets, which de nes the carriers' effective price schedules. In the data, there are a number of cases in which the price schedules set by carrier A in market 1 and in market 2 are identical point by point over the range of usage levels between 1 and 1000 minutes per month. Frequently in such cases, carrier B also offers a price schedule in market 1 that is identical to the schedule it offers in market 2, although its price schedule differs from carrier A's. This paper hypothesizes that this practice is a method for facilitating tacit collusion. Thomas Schelling suggested that players are likely to use a mechanism of this sort to coordinate their actions if they are unable to communicate directly (or are legally forbidden to do so).
FIGURE 5. ILLUSTRATION OF IDENTICAL PRICING
People can often concert their intentions or expectations with others if each knows that the other is trying to do the same. Most situations . . . provide some clue for coordinating behavior, some focal point. . . . Finding the key, or rather nding a key . . . may depend on imagination more than on logic; it may depend on analogy, precedent, accidental arrangement, symmetry, aesthetic or geometric conguration, casuistic reasoning, and who the parties are and what they know about each other. (Schelling, 1960, p. 67) Of course, there are alternative, noncollusive hypotheses that could explain why a rm sets the same price schedules across different markets. For example, as Figure 3 shows, the markets in which rms have multimarket contact are often geographically close to each other. If markets that are geographically close have similar demand characteristics, then rms may set the same price schedules in those markets because of the similarity of demand, not because they are trying to coordinate. Another possible reason for using a single price schedule in multiple markets is that it reduces menu costs associated with pricing. For example, it may be that setting the same prices in two markets enables a rm to produce only one set of marketing materials (brochures, lea ets, contracts). Alternatively, the rm may save the cost of conducting specialized market research in each market it serves by using the same schedule in multiple markets. Finally, if advertising mediaradio, television, or newspapers-spill over between markets, then advertising a price in one city may also advertise it in another, which means that if the rm sets the same prices in both markets, it can reduce its advertising costs.
Identifying the role played by tacit collusion in the presence of these alternative explanations for identical pricing across markets is a potential dif culty, since the two explanations are not mutually exclusive. In recognition of these dif culties, the empirical strategy proceeds in three steps. First, Section 5 examines whether identical pricing across markets depends on multimarket contact or whether it can be explained by other, unrelated reasons. The second step, in Section 6, examines whether identical pricing across markets actually raises price, which should be the case if the motivation for identical pricing is tacit collusion, but not if only noncooperative explanations hold. The second step is important because even if identical pricing does depend on multimarket contact, tacit collusion need not be the motivation. 5 In a nal step, Section 7 veri es that the empirical nding of higher prices in the markets in which there is identical pricing across markets is the result of coordination and not some other characteristic of the market.
Identical Pricing and Multimarket Contact
This section begins the empirical investigation of the primary hypothesis of this paper, namely that identical pricing across markets is a mechanism whereby rms with multimarket contact can coordinate 5. For example, suppose that a rm would like to set the same prices in several markets in order to reduce menu costs. If the rm has different competitors in those markets who have very different price schedules, using the same prices across the markets may be very far from a best response in at least one of the markets. As a result, the rm may set identical prices in two markets only when it meets the same competitors (who are also using identical prices), although its motivation for doing so would be purely noncooperative. their efforts to tacitly collude. There are, in the time period covered by this study, multiple occasions in which the same effective price prevails in two markets at once. What remains to be tested is whether there is evidence that this is a tool for facilitating tacit collusion.
If the reason that the same effective price schedule is observed in multiple markets is that rms are using identical pricing across markets as a tool for tacit collusion, then one would expect those to be markets across which there is multimarket contact. Furthermore, one would expect to see multimarket contact continue to have explanatory power even when allowing for some alternative explanations for observing the same prices in multiple markets. Two alternative explanations, demand similarity and menu costs of pricing, were introduced in the previous section and are tested here.
In order to test these explanations empirically, I use a probit regression based on carriers in pairs of markets drawn from the 90 largest SMAs in the US. I have complete information for 81 of these markets, and they are the basis for the empirical analysis of Sections 5 through 8. For all possible pairs of markets, I calculate the prevailing effective price schedule at 6-month intervals for both the wireline carrier and the nonwireline carrier in each market. I can thus identify any pair of markets in which the same effective price schedule prevails in both markets at a single point in time.
The regression is performed as follows. There is one observation for each unique market pair. The 81 individual markets yield 3240 pairs of markets. The dependent variable equals one if the same effective price schedule is observed in the two markets in the market pair at some point during the sample period. If the same effective price schedules are never simultaneously available in the two markets in the pair, the dependent variable is equal to 0.
To test whether the same prices being available in different markets is associated with multimarket contact, and thus possibly with tacit collusion, one of the explanatory variables is an indicator variable for multimarket contact. Consider an observation of markets m 1 and m 2 . Each market is served by two carriers, a wireline carrier (w) and a nonwireline carrier (n). Suppose that market m 1 is served by carriers w 1 and n 1 , market m 2 by carriers w 2 and n 2 . If w 1 5 w 2 and n 1 5 n 2 , then the multimarket contact dummy variable equals 1; otherwise it is 0. To test the alternative explanation that carriers use identical prices in markets that have similar demand, I control directly for the similarity across the markets of characteristics that are correlated with 6. The multimarket contact indicator variable is also set equal to 1 in the sole case in which w 1 5 n 2 and n 1 5 w 2 .
demand for cellular telephone service: population, the growth rate of population, median income, average commuting time, and number of business establishments. Similarity is measured as the percentage absolute difference in the characteristics across the markets. (If x i is a demand-related characteristic of market i, then the percentage absolute difference between markets 1 and 2 is given by |x 1 2 x 2 |/ 1 2 (x 2 1 x 2 ) . The smaller the difference is, the more similar the markets are.
It is dif cult to account directly for menu costs. However, the suggested ways in which identical pricing might reduce menu costs (e.g., through advertising spillovers) apply to markets that are geographically close. Measures of geographic proximity are included as indicator variables for whether the markets are less than 100, between 100 and 200, or between 200 and 400 miles apart. Indicator variables are used instead of using the distance directly so as not to constrain it to have a linear effect.
The probit regression also includes indicator variables identifying the carriers operating in the markets in each observation to capture any idiosyncratic tendencies of rms to price identically across the markets they serve. The regression results are presented in Table I . In each entry in the table, the probit coef cient is reported rst, followed by the standard error in parentheses.
While the results in Table I do not on their own establish that identical pricing is a means to facilitate tacit collusion. However, they do show that the same prices are more likely to be offered in two different markets in which there is multimarket contact than when there is not. This is the case even when allowing for demand similarities and the proximity of the markets to play a role. In particular, the coef cient estimate on the multimarket contact indicator variable is positive and signi cant in all three speci cations reported in Table I .
The coef cients on the demand characteristic differences are generally negative, which implies that the greater the differences in these characteristics across markets, the less likely it is for the same prices to be offered in the two markets; the results, however, are not statistically signi cant in most cases. The one demand characteristic that is statistically signi cant at the 5% level, population growth, is of opposite signs in columns II and III. It is thus dif cult to draw any consistent conclusions about the role of demand similarity in determining the similarity of prices across markets.
As is also shown in Table I , the same effective price schedule is more likely to be offered in two markets if they are geographically closer. The menu-costs explanation for identical pricing applies primarily to markets that are geographically close to each other. In addition, since demand characteristics are likely to be similar in adjacent areas, the proximity of markets helps to control for similarity in any unobserved demand characteristics. The results of this section suggest that identical pricing across markets is associated with multimarket contact. While there is some evidence that demand similarities and particularly the proximity of the markets also increase the likelihood of observing the same effective price schedule in different markets, this is not necessarily inconsistent with identical pricing across markets aiding in facilitating tacit collusion. Even if the primary motivation is signaling, identical pricing across markets is a signal that is less costly to use in cases where the markets are more similar.
Identical Pricing and Average Prices
The section continues the empirical investigation of whether the reason the same effective price schedule is observed in multiple markets is that rms are choosing to set identical prices across markets as a means to tacitly collude. The association found in the previous section of multimarket contact with the likelihood of observing the same effective price schedule in multiple markets is consistent with this explanation. Furthermore, the empirical results of Section 5 fail to nd strong evidence to support alternative explanations; however, the market demographics and proximity measures used to test these alternative hypotheses are likely imperfect. As a result, this section seeks further evidence that carriers in this industry use identical prices across markets as a way to coordinate tacit collusion by examining the effect identical pricing has on average prices. If identical pricing is a means to facilitate tacit collusion, it should raise average prices.
To determine the effect of identical pricing across markets on price levels, I regress average price on demand characteristics, rm and time effects, and dummies for the use of identical pricing. The study uses data on the same 81 markets used in the probit regressions of Section 5, although in a slightly different con guration. Since Section 5 was concerned with the conditions under which the same effective price schedule would be observed in multiple markets, the unit of observation was a pair of markets drawn from the sample of 81 markets. The regressions of this section are concerned with prices charged in individual markets; therefore each observation is based on a single market. Each observation can be de ned by the triple (m, j , t), where m denotes the market, j denotes the carrier, and t denotes the date. There are up to 8 observations of each carrier in each market, taken at 6-month intervals. Since not all markets are in operation at the beginning of the sample period, the sample contains 584 out of a maximum possible of 1296 observations. The dependent variable is the average price charged by a carrier in a market at a point in time, which is calculated in terms of average cents per minute. Let T (i) be the total cost for usage of i minutes per month using the effective price schedule (the lower envelope of the two-part tariffs). Using T (i), the average number of cents per minute for each usage level can be calculated, and then averaged over usage levels from 1 to 1000 minutes per month. The nal measure can be written as 7 average price 5 1 1000
7. This measure of average price is the average price of a minute under a particular effective price schedule, but does not necessarily measure the average price paid in the market, unless customers' usage levels are uniformly distributed between 1 and 1000 minutes per month. Results using alternative measures of price are reported in later regressions. The explanatory variables of interest are indicator variables for whether the market is part of a pair in which there is identical pricing by the rm under consideration, or by both rms. Additional controls for the average level of prices are the demand characteristics of the market, a rm dummy for the carrier, and time effects. Summary statistics for the variables in the regression are given in Table II . The results of the regressions are reported in Table III . The regressions in Table III are estimated using ordinary least squares. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and are also corrected to allow for the correlation of errors over time within a rm in a particular market. In column I, average prices are estimated to be higher by 3.20 cents/min, or 6.9%, for a carrier that is using identical prices across markets. This coef cient is statistically different from zero at the 5% con dence level. Column II adds an additional explanatory variable, an indicator for both rms pricing identically. In this specication, a carrier's average price is estimated to rise by 3.97 cents/min, or 8.5%, when it uses identical prices across markets; there is no statistically signi cant additional effect of having both rms use identical prices across markets.
The positive coef cient estimated for "Carrier using identical prices" is supportive of the hypothesis that identical pricing across markets is a mechanism to facilitate tacit collusion. It indicates that average prices are higher, controlling for market and rm characteristics, when carriers offer the same prices in multiple markets. Under the tacit-collusion hypothesis, the variable "Both carriers using identical prices" might also have been expected to have a positive coef cient. This variable captures any incremental increase in the carrier's price level when its competitor joins it in using identical prices across markets. If the prices set by the carrier when it alone uses identical prices across markets already re ect the tacitly collusive price level it hopes to maintain once its competitor responded, then there may not be much incremental increase in the carrier's price level when the competitor responds with identical prices. This would explain why the estimated coef cient is statistically insigni cant. Two of the ve demand characteristics are statistically signicant, namely population growth and average commuting time. The implication of the coef cient estimates is that an increase in the population growth rate by one percentage point increases the average price by almost 2 cents/min, and an increase of one minute in the average commuting time raises the price by about one cent. Most of these demand characteristics would be expected to raise demand and price; population growth, however, could have either a positive effect, if population growth is an indicator for economic growth, or a negative effect, if carriers price for market share. The importance of commuting time re ects the fact that over the period covered by these data, cellular phones were primarily a car accessory, among whose primary attractions was making commuting time productive. Thus longer commutes could be expected to raise the demand for and price of cellular service.
These results indicate that, controlling for the characteristics of the market and for the identity of the carrier, identical pricing across markets appears to raise average prices. Higher prices would not be expected if the motivation for identical pricing were one of the noncooperative motivations described in Section 4. When combined with the fact that identical pricing appears to be used most frequently when carriers meet in multiple markets, this evidence is suggestive of tacit collusion.
The average price measure used in Table III is a measure that is averaged over all usage levels. This measure is intended to capture general changes in prices (vertical shifts of the effective price schedule). If, however, the schedule rises in some places and falls in others, this could be obscured by using the average price measure. To nd out whether the results reported in Table III re ect general changes in prices, I examine the effect of identical pricing at various points along the price schedule. If at each of these points identical pricing increases the price, then identical pricing can be inferred to shift the entire schedule. I reestimated column II of Table III , replacing average price as the dependent variable with the price calculated at usage levels of 100, 300, 500, and 1000 min/month. The results of the regressions using prices measured at each of these usage levels, reported in Table IV , are very similar to those reported in Table III. In particular, when a rm uses identical prices, its prices are higher by 2.24 cents/min (at a usage level of 1000 min) to 5.83 cents/min (at a usage level of 100 min), which is an increase of 6.7% to 10.2% on the price at these levels. As in Table III , the coef cients on the indicator for both rms using identical prices across markets are not statistically signi cant. These results indicate that prices are affected similarly over a range of usage levels when rms use identical prices across markets.
Alternative Explanations for Average Prices
So far, I have argued that the occurrence of identical pricing across markets cannot be explained solely by noncooperative motivations, and have shown that identical pricing is associated with higher prices. In this section, I consider several alternatives to the explanation of tacit collusion for the empirical association between identical pricing and higher prices.
The Direct Effect of Multimarket Contact on Average Prices
Although I have argued that identical pricing is a mechanism through which cellular carriers tacitly collude, other empirical studies have shown that multimarket contact is generally associated with higher prices. To show that the higher prices indeed result from using the identical pricing mechanism and not from multimarket contact operating through some other mechanism, this section replicates the averageprice regressions of Section 6, directly incorporating measures of multimarket contact. This also allows for comparison with previous studies of multimarket contact. If some other practice or feature associated with multimarket contact were the real cause of higher prices, and if identical pricing were correlated with multimarket contact, then the positive coefcient estimated for identical pricing could be picking up the effect of an omitted multimarket contact variable. To incorporate multimarket contact directly, I regress the average price charged by a carrier in a market on three different measures of multimarket contact, as well as the demand characteristics, identical-pricing dummies, and the rm effects used in Tables III and IV of Section 6.
The rst measure of multimarket contact, used in column I of Table V , is the number of other markets in which the carrier meets the same competitor as it does in this market. The inclusion of this direct measure of multimarket contact has virtually no effect on any of the estimated parameters compared to column II of Table III . Furthermore, the coef cient on this variable is statistically indistinguishable from zero, providing no evidence that the results of Section 6 are due to an omitted variable. Using this measure supposes that the effect of multimarket contact is linear in the number of other markets in which carriers have contact. Since the measure takes on only ve values (0, 1, 2, 4, and 8), a second way to measure multimarket contact would be to use dummy variables for each of the levels; these results are reported in column II of Table V. Using the discrete measure, multimarket contact appears to lower prices, not raise them, although not all of the coef cients are signi cant. 8 The estimated coef cient of the identical-pricing dummy, while reduced by about 22% compared to column II of Table III , is still signi cant. The third measure of multimarket contact, used in column III, is a simple indicator for whether rms compete with each other in any other market or not. The coefcient of this indicator variable is negative and signi cant, and the identical-pricing coef cient is now slightly larger than estimates in previous speci cations.
These results do not comport with what has been found in most of the empirical literature, namely that multimarket contact is associated with higher prices (Evans and Kessides, 1994; Hughes and Oughton, 1993; Singal, 1993) . 9 These results are, however, not inconsistent with the hypothesis of this paper, which is that although multimarket contact may enhance the sustainability of tacit collusion, rms
8. An F-test rejects at a 5% signi cance level the hypotheses that the coef cients on the multimarket contact dummies in column II of Table V are jointly zero.
9. Although Bernheim and Whinston (1990) in fact predict that in some cases multimarket contact can lower price, the more common expectation is that it will raise prices. may still need to develop a means to communicate and coordinate their actions. Speaking loosely, multimarket contact is a necessary, but not suf cient, condition. The empirical results of Sections 5 and 6 suggest this is true. The same effective price schedule is more likely to be observed in two different markets if rms have multimarket contact in those markets, and when rms use identical prices across markets, prices are, statistically and economically, signi cantly higher. That multimarket contact itself is not associated with higher prices suggests only that it alone is not suf cient to achieve tacit collusion.
The Single-Market Effect on Average Prices
Another alternative explanation for identical pricing across markets is that arbitrage forces the prices in close markets together. In the cellular telephone industry, the power of arbitrage is mitigated by roaming fees imposed on callers when they use their telephones outside their local markets, a substantial deterrent against shopping in different markets for better rates. 10 However, even if arbitrage does not force carriers to price in multiple markets as if they were pricing in a single market, there may be managerial reasons to do so. For example, it may be that the markets are managed by a single of ce. Furthermore, the FCC in making its original awards might have treated some markets as if they were single market and awarded them to the same licensee, especially if they were markets that might be regarded as a single greater metropolitan area. Possible examples include Boston and Worcester, Miami and West Palm Beach, Los Angeles and Oxnard, and San Francisco and San Jose. To the extent that these are large cities with higher costs of living in general, they might also have higher prices also for cellular service. Thus the estimated identicalpricing coef cient could capture the higher prices associated with one of these greater metropolitan areas, rather than the effect of tacit collusion through the identical-pricing mechanism. To test whether this is the case, variables indicating whether the nearest market is served by the same carriers are added to the previously estimated average-price regressions. These variables should indicate markets that were awarded jointly because they were expected to be administered together.
As Table VI shows, having the nearest market served by one or both of same two carriers is associated with a statistically signi cant 10. The system of roaming rates enables a cellular customer to use his or her phone in any market, whether it is served by his or her carrier or not. The carrier in the outside market serves the call and bills the customer's home carrier, who bills the customer at the roaming rate charged by the outside carrier. Roaming fees were substantial and pervasive during this period. increase in price of 4.6 cents/min. The inclusion of this variable nevertheless leaves the estimated effect of identical pricing similar to that found in previous speci cations. This is consistent with the hypothesis that when close markets are served by the same carrier they have higher prices. Identical pricing, however, does not appear to be merely a proxy for this effect; in column II, the estimated effect of identical pricing is still positive and signi cant, although the estimates are smaller by about 23% than the comparable estimates in Table III .
The Regional Effect on Average Prices
Finally, I consider the possibility that the identical-pricing effect is a regional phenomenon. Since the northeastern region of the United States is more densely populated than other areas of the country, it contains more large cities and a higher concentration of markets in which there is multimarket contact (see Fig. 3 ). As a result, this region has proportionately more cases of identical pricing than other regions. If the prices for cellular service in the Northeast are also generally higher than in other areas of the country, as the cost of living is, then the coef cient on identical pricing might re ect a regional effect rather than an increase in price due to tacit collusion.
I test this explanation by including regional dummy variables based on standard census de nitions of four regions (West, South, Midwest, and Northeast). The results in Table VII include a constant, and hence exclude the dummy for the northeastern region. The estimates indicate that prices are very similar in the West, South, and Northeast (the excluded category), and distinctly lower in the Midwest. Once controlling for the regional effects, the estimated effect of identical pricing is about 20% larger than that estimated in the column II of Table III . Although there are regional effects in cellular prices, those effects do not appear to be confounded with the effect of identical pricing across markets.
Another Form of Tacit Collusion
In the introduction of this paper, a distinction was made between two forms of parallel pricing: price matching and identical pricing across markets. Up to this point, this paper has considered exclusively identical pricing across markets, that is, a rm using the identical price schedules in different markets. A more familiar kind of parallel pricing is price matching, in which different rms set the same prices within a market. This section takes up the question of whether price matching is used to facilitate tacit collusion in the cellular telephone industry. The empirical results of this section show that when cellular carriers match prices within a market, it does increase average prices. Price matching, however, does not appear to be associated with multimarket contact.
Price matching is de ned as follows. Consider a market m that is served by two carriers, w and n. As in Section 6, let T j ( i) be the total cost for the use of i minutes per month using the effective price schedule (the lower envelope of the two-part tariffs) offered by rm j . The two carriers, w and n, have matched prices at usage level i if T w (i) 5 T n ( i). The fraction of the price schedule in which the carriers have matched prices can be calculated as fraction of price schedule matched 5 1 1000
where I( ) is an indicator function that equals 1 if the argument is true. If this measure is equal to 1, in other words if the schedules of the two carriers in the market are equal to each other at every usage level, then the price schedules are said to match exactly.
Table VIII modi es the speci cation used in Table III to examine the effect of identical pricing across markets on average price level by substituting variables that indicate when there is price matching between the two carriers in a market. 11 The estimates on the price-matching coef cients suggest that when carriers match price exactly within a market, prices are higher by about 7 cents/min, which is somewhat larger than the effect of identical pricing across 11. Price matching and identical pricing across markets typically do not occur simultaneously. Identical pricing across markets means that a carrier A sets the same prices in markets 1 and 2, and (usually) its competitor, carrier B, sets the same prices in markets 1 and 2. Price matching occurs if carriers A and B set the same prices as each other in market 1. There are isolated examples in which both occur. This would be the case if, for example, the same price schedule were used by carrier A in markets 1 and 2 and by carrier B in market 1. markets. Other coef cient estimates are similar to those estimated in Table III . While price matching does appear to raise average prices, it is not associated with multimarket contact. Table IX shows the results of regressions that predict whether there will be price matching in a market as a function of multimarket contact. Each observation is a market at a particular point in time. The variables used in this regression have all been de ned and described above. The dependent variable is the fraction of the price schedule that is matched by the two carriers, as described above. 12 The primary explanatory variables of interest are measures of multimarket contact, which is measured three ways, as in Table V : a count of the number of markets in which the carriers in this market also compete, an indicator variable for the level of contact, and an indicator that the rms compete in at least one other market. The regressions also include market demand characteristics, and xed rm and time effects. The regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, and the standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. None of the multimarket contact coef cient estimates are signi cantly different from zero. The coef cient of the variable "Firms compete in at least one other market" in column III has the highest t-statistic, 1.52, with a p-value of 0.129.
Overall, I interpret the results of this section as having two primary implications. First, the results indicate that there may be multiple forms of tacit collusion operating in this industry, and that price matching may be one of them. The effect of price matching, however, appears to be orthogonal to that of identical pricing across markets. (This can be seen in columns III and IV of Table VIII. When indicators for both pricing behaviors are used in the regressions, the pricematching effects are very close to those estimated in columns I and II, while the identical-pricing effects are very similar to those estimated in Table III .) The second implication is that if rms are taking advantage of multimarket contact in order to enhance their abilities to tacitly collude, it appears that price matching is not their means of doing so.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the effect of multimarket contact in the cellular telephone industry by identifying a pattern of setting identical prices across markets, and hypothesizing that such a mechanism could be used to coordinate prices. This mechanism is related to higher average prices, and is used most commonly between rms that compete in multiple markets. Further examination showed that the higher prices are indeed the result of identical pricing, not of multimarket contact alone or some other characteristic of the analyzed markets. Together, these suggest that identical pricing across markets serves as a mechanism to support tacit collusion. This paper makes two main contributions. First, the paper indicates that the FCC's expectation that competition between two rms would produce competitive pricing does not appear to have been ful lled in all markets. Although prices were probably lower than they would have been if carriers had been granted exclusive licences by city, it appears that carriers were able to tacitly collude in some markets, and that the result was prices that were higher by approximately 7%-10% in those markets. The paper's second contribution is in understanding the way in which multimarket contact facilitates tacit collusion. While previous empirical studies have found higher prices associated with multimarket contact, this paper demonstrates a mechanism that enables rms to translate contact with each other into the commonality purpose necessary to tacitly collude.
Data Appendix
The purpose of this appendix is to explain how variables and observations are de ned, given the nonstandard nature of some of the data used in this paper.
A.1 The Source of the Data
The price data were collected by a small consulting company, which, during the initial development of the industry, persuaded the carriers to provide it with detailed price data. Carriers agreed to submit reports when their prices changed; thus the data take the form of a chronology of price changes for each carrier in each market that it serves.
A.2 Pricing Data
In order to be able to compare pricing information across carriers within a market or across markets, I rst create a full series by lling in the data between the periodic observations of each carrier in each market. The result is a monthly series of the menu of prevailing prices for each carrier in each market.
The pricing data contain detailed information on each price plan offered by the carriers. From these data, I can construct an effective price schedule, which I de ne as the lower envelope of the menu of two-part tariffs for usage levels between 1 and 1000 min/month. See Figure 4 for an example. In order to decide whether a carrier is using identical prices across markets I compare the effective price schedule that carrier A offers in market 1 with the effective price schedule A offers in market 2 during the same month. If the two are the same point by point for all usage levels between 1 and 1000 min/month, then carrier A is said to be using identical prices across markets 1 and 2 in that month. If the same is true of the price schedules carrier B offers in markets 1 and 2 during the same month, then the (market 1, market 2) market pair is said to have both rms using identical prices in that month.
A.3 Data for the Probit Regression
An observation is a market pair. There are 81 markets in the sample, which can be combined into 3240 market pairs. The dependent variable in the probit regression is 1 if the same effective price schedule is ever available simultaneously in both markets in the market pair.
The primary explanatory variable of interest in the probit is an indicator for whether there is multimarket contact across the markets considered in the observation. For example, if market 1 is served by carriers A and B, and market 2 is also served by carriers A and B, then the multimarket contact indicator variable would equal one in the (market 1, market 2) observation.
There are controls in the regression, including the difference between the demographic characteristics of the market (measured as the percentage absolute difference), rm dummy variables, and measures of distance between the two markets.
A.4 Data for Average-Price Regressions
The second part of the paper answers the question of what effect using identical prices has on the average price level. For this, a linear regression is used. Each observation is of a single carrier in a particular market at a given date. This arrangement of the data is different from the probit where the basic unit of observation is a market pair.
For the average price regressions, there are 81 markets, each of which has 2 carriers, which are observed as many as 8 times, in March and September; so there could be as many as 1296 observations.
13
In practice, most of the markets do not have both carriers in operation for the whole time, so the actual number of observations is 584.
In the regression, the dependent variable is the average perminute price, which is calculated as the average of the cents-perminute charge for each level of usage from 1 to 1000 min/month, 13. This is true for all years except 1988, in which the data are from March and July. July 1998 was the last month of data collection. The decision to use March and September as the months of observation was made to avoid price promotions around holidays. A number of the regressions reported in the paper were run using alternative timing for the observations, with results similar to those reported in the paper.
according to the formula given in Section 6. In the sample, the mean of the average per-minute price is 46.4 cents/min.
The explanatory variables of interest are two indicator variables. The rst, called "Carrier using identical prices," indicates whether the carrier is offering exactly the same effective price schedule as it offers in this market at this date in another market at this date. In other words, the indicator is equal to one if the answer to the question "Has this carrier set the same prices in some other market at this date?" is yes.
The second variable, called "Both rms using identical prices," indicates whether the carrier and its competitor in this market both offer the same prices in some other market where they compete. In other words, the indicator is equal to one if the answer to the question "Have the carrier and its competitor both set the same prices in some other market at this date as they do in this market at this date?" is yes.
14 The regression also includes controls for the price level including market demographic characteristics and rm and time effects. The standard errors are adjusted to allow correlation across time for a given carrier in a given market.
